It would be an understatement to say that this is a shift in axis. Under the leadership of Kais Saied, Tunisia is changing its diplomatic approach, the foundations of which were laid in the early days of independence. Some are talking of an “aggiornamento” to shake up what used to be called the “constants” of Tunisian diplomacy, which even successive governments since January 14have not dared to touch.
To put it plainly, Tunisian diplomacy, in a way desperate to move towards the West, combined with the prejudices of the countries of the late Third World, to which Tunisia belongs, is being pushed towards other latitudes where it believes it will find its own reward.
In this search, the BRICS are the ideal address. But they are connected, like an umbilical cord, to countries that carry a lot of weight, namely China, Russia and Iran. This is the future diplomatic axis from which Tunisia could perhaps draw its new resources.
The European Union seems to be the first group of countries to balk at this prospect. It did so at its Foreign Affairs Council meeting on June 24. According to Jeune Afrique magazine, the meeting was supposed to address the issue of human rights in Tunisia. In the end, the question of the current rapprochement between the Maghreb country, China, Iran and Russia was raised.
Josep Borrell, one of those scalded by his experience with Tunisia, recalls in particular that the country refused to receive a delegation of MEPs in September last year, accusing the 27 of interfering in the country’s sovereignty. Since then, the European diplomat has not raised the issue of Tunisia. Until it was put on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on June 24.
However, during his speech on Monday, June 24, Josep Borrell did not talk about the human rights situation in Tunisia, as many had expected.
Instead, he surprised his entire audience with an unexpected reflection on “Tunisia’s rapprochement with Russia, China and Iran” – a new tropism on the part of the Tunisian authorities, despite the country being “a long-standing and important partner of the EU”.
Concerned by this new diplomatic direction, Josep Borrell called on the 27 “to make a collective assessment in the light of recent internal and external developments and to avoid certain events that could lead to closer relations with the Chinese, Russian and Iranian governments”.
The High Representative also considered that the issue deserved a more serious debate in the European institutions in the future.
A strategic reorientation!
Less than a month ago, Tunisia’s president, Kais Saied, made his first trip to China and signed a strategic partnership with President Xi Jinping. The week prior, Saied made headlines for becoming the first Tunisian president to visit Iran since the Islamic Revolution. And before that, rumors swirled about Russian planes landing in Djerba, according to the Brookings think-tank.
An analysis by Sharan Grewal, a researcher on Tunisian affairs at Brookings, stresses that it is too early to tell whether any of these events mark a major, strategic realignment of Tunisia away. More likely, Saied is playing global and regional powers against one other to secure the best deal, an art form perfected by other leaders in the region, he adds.
He continues: “Saied has made one major shift to Tunisia’s foreign policy that in turn might help explain his recent outreach to Iran, China, and Russia. Over the past year, Saied has overseen a sea change in Tunisia’s position on the two-state solution for Israelis and the Palestinians. While Tunisia had historically been an outlier in the region for being one of the first to accept a two-state solution, today it is increasingly becoming an outlier for rejecting it.”
While “popular at home, this shift has strained Tunisia’s relations with both the West and the Arab Gulf states. It is in this context of greater isolation internationally that Saied now dangles the threat of relations with Iran, China, and Russia. On the one hand, these countries more naturally fit with Saied’s worldview, both on the Palestinian issue as well as on his broader critique of Western imperialism. Saied’s meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, for instance, reportedly centered on Palestine, with Khamenei praising Saied’s “anti-Zionist stance” and emphasizing the need to develop more such stances in the Arab world, and Saied agreeing, saying “the Islamic world must exit its current passive position.”
At the same time, “Saied has thus far been careful not to push too far and elicit a rupture with Tunisia’s traditional allies. In November, for instance, Saied quashed a bill in parliament that would have criminalized normalization with Israel, on account of it endangering Tunisia’s external interests, presumably with the West and the Arab Gulf states. Indeed, a full realignment or clean break with the West is near impossible, given the strong links Tunisia’s military has with the United States and its economy has with Europe. A more likely scenario is an attempt to balance between these global and regional powers, securing what it can from each.”
Still, whether or not relations with Iran, China, or Russia develop further, “it is clear that Saied has already initiated a sea change in one aspect of Tunisia’s foreign policy, departing from its decades-long endorsement of a two-state solution,” concludes Brookings.
