From the Chedly Ayari swap to the 2026 customs agreement: anatomy of a one-sided relationship
On May 1, 2026, all Tunisian products can now enter China duty-free. Ambassador Wan Li announced this on National Radio on January 28, 2026, describing a “rising dynamic.”
However, official INS data tells a different story: a structurally imbalanced trade relationship, a missed monetary opportunity eight years ago, and a country chasing a train it already let go.
A massive, documented imbalance
Official external trade figures (INS, April 12, 2026) are clear:
On an annualized Q1 2026 basis: 113 million dinars in exports versus 11,072 million dinars in imports — meaning 1 dinar exported for every 98 dinars imported.
Between 2024 and 2025, imports from China surged by +60.9%, while exports declined. It is from this low point that the customs agreement is meant to operate.
Q1 2026 : a fragile positive signal
Q1 2026 data shows a new development: Tunisian exports to China increased by +88% (from 15.0 to 28.2 million dinars), while imports fell by −7.3%. The quarterly deficit shrank by 232 million dinars.
This shift coincides with a surge in olive oil exports (+38% in Q1 2026, reaching 1,991.6 million dinars) and the first shipment of 50 tons of Tunisian oil arriving in Hubei in March 2026. The agreement is beginning to have a limited effect.
However, caution is needed: a +88% rise on a base of 15 million dinars is only +13.2 million dinars. Meanwhile, the mining, phosphate and derivatives sector fell by −20.3%, offsetting part of the gains.
The customs agreement: a two-year window
The opportunity is open only until May 2028 for Tunisia, a middle-income country.
Even in the best-case scenario, the reduction in the deficit remains marginal. Chinese imports, raw materials, capital goods, manufactured products, are structural and not easily replaced by Tunisian exports.
Meeting Chinese standards, building export volumes, and mastering logistics are major challenges that cannot be solved in two years without a national strategy.
Tunisia as a hub: the silent opportunity
Tunisia benefits from a free trade agreement with the EU. China faces increasing US and EU tariffs. Chinese goods assembled in Tunisia and labeled “Made in Tunisia” could enter Europe tariff-free. This mechanism, already used by Morocco, could attract FDI, industrial jobs, and technology transfer.
Q1 2026 external trade data confirms the base: 11,628.1 million dinars of exports to the EU in just one quarter, or 71.5% of total exports. The infrastructure exists; the industrial policy to leverage it does not.
Phosphates: real opportunity, real risk
Ambassador Wan Li noted Chinese interest in Tunisian phosphate extraction. However, Q1 2026 already shows a −20.3% decline in the sector’s exports, highlighting structural fragility and underinvestment.
China could bring capital, technology, and Asian distribution networks. However, the risk is equally real: a “raw materials for infrastructure” model where added value is captured abroad while Tunisia provides resources. Environmental commitments must be legally binding, not merely declared.
The Chedly Ayari swap: a missed opportunity
In December 2016, then Central Bank Governor Chedly Ayari signed a memorandum in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart on a dinar–yuan currency swap.
Such a mechanism would have allowed Tunisia to pay for Chinese imports in yuan instead of US dollars, preserving foreign reserves and reducing exchange-rate risk.
Timeline data is clear: the agreement was signed, but Tunisia ultimately did not activate it. Meanwhile, Morocco concluded a $10 billion yuan swap in 2016 that remains operational.
At an estimated rate of 1 TND = 2.35 CNY, financing even part of Tunisia’s 11 billion dinar imports in yuan could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars annually in foreign exchange reserves.
Four tools, one possible strategy
The available instruments are complementary:
– Customs agreement (market access)
– Industrial hub strategy (value creation)
– Phosphate partnerships (resources + technology)
– Currency swap (financial stability)
Individually, they are insufficient. Together, they could reshape the relationship.
Two years to avoid another missed train
Q1 2026 confirms two realities at once: the imbalance remains massive (1 to 98, with a 2.74 billion dinar quarterly deficit), but early signs of rebalancing exist (exports +88%, imports −7.3%).
The trend is there. The strategy is not yet.
The story of the Chedly Ayari swap is not anecdotal. It symbolizes a relationship where decisions come late and gains come elsewhere.
Without a coordinated national strategy between trade policy, the Central Bank, and industry, Tunisia risks exporting a bit more olive oil to Shanghai while China captures the value chain elsewhere, from phosphates to infrastructure.
