As of June 24, 2026, three figures released by the Central Bank of Tunisia tell the story of a single underlying tension. Net foreign exchange reserves stood at 25.194 billion Tunisian dinars (TND), equivalent to 102 days of imports. Currency in circulation reached TND 29.332 billion.
Total refinancing volume amounted to 10.607 billion TND. Taken together, these figures paint the picture of an economy where cash continues to dominate, while banks remain heavily reliant on injections from the central bank.
Foreign exchange reserves setting the framework
The first signal comes from foreign exchange reserves. Net foreign assets cover 102 days of imports. For a country that imports its energy and a large share of its intermediate goods, this cushion remains modest. Yet it shapes everything else. It determines the country’s ability to meet its external payment obligations. It also affects the servicing of foreign currency debt.
In the background, it defines the limits of monetary policy. A central bank with eroding reserves has less room for maneuver. It cannot support domestic liquidity indefinitely without putting pressure on the dinar.
As a benchmark, the International Monetary Fund often considers around three months of imports as a relatively comfortable reserve position. However, this reference does not appear in the data published by the Central Bank and should not be viewed as an official threshold.
Refinancing revealing a structural deficit
The second signal is more striking. Total refinancing volume reached 10.607 billion TND. This reflects the amount banks borrow from the Central Bank to manage their liquidity needs. This is not a temporary imbalance. It points to a structural liquidity deficit within the banking system. Banks do not possess sufficient resources on their own to finance the economy. They depend on a permanent liquidity lifeline. That lifeline comes at a cost, which is ultimately passed on through higher borrowing rates for businesses and households. The higher the refinancing needs, the more expensive credit tends to become.
The weight of cash as the key factor
The third figure sheds light on the other two. Currency in circulation climbed to 29.332 billion TND, roughly 2.8 times the refinancing volume. This massive amount of cash held outside the banking system is far from insignificant. It reflects a strong preference for cash transactions, fueled by the size of the informal economy and incomplete financial inclusion. Every dinar withdrawn and hoarded is a dinar that no longer returns to the banking system as deposits. It represents a drain of liquidity from banks.
How cash leakage fuels dependence
This is where the link between cash circulation and refinancing becomes clear. Banknotes withdrawn from branches do not flow back into bank balance sheets. They reduce banks’ liquidity and push institutions toward the Central Bank for funding. The ratio between the two figures is revealing.
Refinancing represents around 36 percent of the cash in circulation. In other words, for every 100 dinars circulating in cash, the banking system borrows the equivalent of 36 dinars to keep functioning. This comparison is purely accounting-based.
It illustrates the scale of the dependence without suggesting that cash circulation alone is responsible for refinancing needs.
A liquidity shortage with multiple causes
Banks’ liquidity needs cannot be explained solely by cash usage. They are also influenced by the budget deficit, partly financed through the banking system, by reserve requirement levels, and by the state of the balance of payments. Cash hoarding is a contributing factor, but only one among several. Presenting cash as the sole explanation would be an oversimplification unsupported by the data alone.
The delicate balance between liquidity and defending the dinar
Another important dynamic deserves attention. Foreign exchange reserves and refinancing policy do not operate independently from one another. When foreign reserves decline, the Central Bank must strike a balance between two competing objectives: supporting banking liquidity on one hand and defending the value of the dinar on the other. This trade-off becomes more difficult when reserves are limited. With only 102 days of import coverage, the cushion against external shocks remains thin. Monetary flexibility therefore ultimately depends on the strength of the external accounts.
A chain where no link stands alone
These three indicators are not merely coexisting; they are interconnected. The preference for cash reduces bank resources. Banks compensate for part of this shortage through refinancing. Refinancing itself depends on the room allowed by the foreign exchange position. And the foreign exchange position remains vulnerable to the energy import bill and debt repayment obligations. No part of the chain operates in isolation.
A lasting fragility rather than a crisis
The conclusion emerges clearly. As long as financial inclusion progresses slowly and the informal economy maintains its scale, Tunisia’s banking system will remain heavily dependent on the Central Bank. Reducing refinancing needs requires bringing cash back into formal financial channels.
This challenge is less about monetary engineering than about rebuilding trust and strengthening financial inclusion. The figures from June 24 do not describe a crisis. They describe a persistent, deeply rooted, and costly fragility.
